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Abstract. 
This paper proposes a security architecture for the basic 
cross indexing systems emerging as foundational 
structures in current health information systems. In these 
systems unique identifiers are issued to healthcare 
providers and consumers. In most cases, such numbering 
schemes are national in scope and must therefore 
necessarily be used via an indexing system to identify 
records contained in pre-existing local, regional or national 
health information systems. Most large scale electronic 
health record systems envisage that such correlation 
between national healthcare identifiers and pre-existing 
identifiers will be performed by some centrally 
administered cross referencing, or index system. This 
paper is concerned with the security architecture for such 
indexing servers and the manner in which they interface 
with pre-existing health systems (including both 
workstations and servers). The paper proposes two 
required structures to achieve the goal of a national scale, 
and secure exchange of electronic health information, 
including: (a) the employment of high trust computer 
systems to perform an indexing function, and (b) the 
development and deployment of an appropriate high trust 
interface module, a Healthcare Interface Processor (HIP), 
to be integrated into the connected workstations or servers 
of healthcare service providers. This proposed architecture 
is specifically oriented toward requirements identified in 
the Connectivity Architecture for Australia’s e-health 
scheme as outlined by NEHTA and the national e-health 
strategy released by the Australian Health Ministers. 
Keywords: architecture of health information systems, 
security for health information systems, health informatics, 
network security for health systems, trusted system, 
indexing based system for e-health regime, HL7. 
1 Introduction 
Undoubtedly, the adoption of e-health has much potential 
to improve healthcare delivery and performance 
(Goldschmidt 2005; AHM 2008). Anticipated 
improvements relate to better management and 
coordination of healthcare information and increased 
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quality and safety of healthcare delivery. On the other 
hand, a security violation in healthcare records, such as an 
unauthorised disclosure or unauthorised alteration of 
individual health information, can significantly undermine 
both healthcare providers’ and consumers’ confidence and 
trust in the e-health system. A crisis in confidence in 
national e-health systems would seriously degrade the 
realisation of potential benefits. 
Evidence from the NEHTA’s Report on Feedback 
Individual Electronic Health Record (NEHTA 2008c) 
suggests that numerous healthcare consumers and 
providers embrace the adoption of national individual 
electronic health records because of the potential benefits. 
There are a number of consumers, however, who are 
reluctant to embrace e-health because of privacy concerns. 
Obviously, the security and privacy protection of 
information is critical to the successful implementation of 
any e-health initiative. NEHTA, therefore, rightly places 
security and privacy protection at the centre of its e-health 
approach.  
In order to address the requirements for enabling a 
secure national e-health environment, we propose a 
security architecture based around the current strategic 
directions from the Australian Government’s National 
E-Health Strategy (AHM 2008) and Connectivity 
Architecture (NEHTA 2008b) proposed by NEHTA, both 
recently released in December 2008.  
This proposed architecture defines a model to support 
secure communications between healthcare providers and 
the Index System in the national e-health environment, 
which some other approaches fail to address. We draw on 
important lessons from the Internet’s Domain Name 
System (DNS) for the development and deployment of the 
national healthcare Index System. Our approach embraces 
the hierarchical and distributed nature of DNS and defines 
the required components for a secure architecture for 
Australia’s national e-health scheme. This proposed 
architecture employs a high trust computer platform to 
perform indexing functions and a high trust interface 
module as the application proxy to connect to the 
healthcare Index System and other healthcare service 
providers. 
2 Paper Structure 
This paper begins with a summary of the benefits 
associated with increased adoption of e-health; however, 
risks to privacy in such e-health systems must be 
addressed. Addressing the security appropriately is 
considered as key to success of the e-health 
implementation. Section 3 defines the paper’s scope and 
details our assumptions in the context of the Australian 
national e-health environment. Section 4 investigates three 
representative e-health initiatives resembling the approach 
being adopted in Australia. Section 5 reasons the lesson we 
can learn from Internet’s DNS to design the national 
e-health Index System. The authors’ proposal for a secure 
connectivity architecture with the required structures is 
described in Section 6. Section 7 illustrates a request for a 
specific patient’s health records via the Index System with 
a set of information flows. The analysis of this work is 
incorporated in Section 8. Finally, the conclusion is drawn 
and future direction for work is outlined in Section 9. 
3 Scope and Assumptions 
The Australian National E-heath Strategy (AHM 2008) 
defines the basic building blocks for a national e-health 
system  including: (1) the implementation of the healthcare 
identifier (HI) scheme for healthcare consumers and 
providers, (2) the establishment of standards for the 
consistent collection and exchange of health information, 
(3) the establishment of rules and protocols for secure 
healthcare information exchange, and (4) the  
implementation of underlying physical computing and 
network infrastructure. We propose a secure architecture 
to address the protection of clinical information exchange 
in a reliable and secure manner. This proposed architecture 
is specifically concerned with the secure architecture 
design and development to facilitate interactions between 
healthcare providers, healthcare organisations and the 
national Index System rather than focusing on healthcare 
consumers accessing healthcare information.  
It is anticipated that the national HI scheme will be 
established by mid 2010 (AHM 2009). This paper assumes 
that an adequate national legislative framework will be 
established to support the management and operation of 
the healthcare identifier scheme (NHHRC 2009) to enable 
a national e-health implementation by July 2010. 
Presumably, the National Authentication Service for 
Health (NASH) becomes available for Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) services to support digital signing and 
data encryption in the national e-health environment. It is 
also assumed that the National Broadband Network 
(NBN) infrastructure will be constructed for electronically 
enabling access and transfer of health information 
nationally. 
In the context of this paper, a service requester refers to 
the entity that uses a service provided by another entity. A 
service provider is an entity that offers a service used by 
another entity. A service provider can be a healthcare 
provider, healthcare organisation or organisation 
commissioned to provide services for healthcare providers 
or healthcare organisations. 
4 Related Work  
While most nations would appear to have some e-health 
initiatives at some stage of investigation or 
implementation, this section focuses on three national 
e-health architectures resembling the approach being 
adopted in Australia. 
4.1 Dutch National E-health Strategy   
The Dutch e-health infrastructure is constructed by the 
National IT Institute for Healthcare in the Netherlands 
(NICTIZ)
1
. The Dutch national e-health approach uses the 
National Healthcare Information Hub, National Switch 
Point (Landelijk SchakelPunt or LSP) to enable the 
exchange of healthcare information. There is no clinical 
information stored at the LSP. The clinical data details 
reside at local health information systems. The Dutch 
national index system, LSP, includes services such as 
identification and authentication, authorisation, addressing, 
logging and standardization of messages services  (The 
Dutch Ministry of Health 2007)  
The LSP links healthcare providers’ information 
systems together to enable the electronic exchange of 
health information nationally. The Dutch national e-health 
network connectivity architecture requires the healthcare 
partitioners’ health information system to comply with the 
security requirements for a “Qualified Health Information 
System to be allowed to connect to the LSP via a qualified 
commercial service provider. Such IT service providers 
are commissioned to provide secure communications 
between healthcare information systems and the LSP” 
(Spronk 2008) . 
While the healthcare provider requests specific patient 
information which is located in other healthcare 
information systems, all queries are relayed via the LSP. 
The healthcare service provider responds to the LSP. 
Namely, the LSP aggregates the requested health data 
from the health service providers and then routes the 
health data to the requester. There is no direct 
communication between the healthcare service providing 
system and requesting system. The LSP also logs which 
healthcare practitioners have accessed patient data for 
accountability  (The Dutch Ministry of Health 2007).  
The Dutch national index system, LSP, is the central 
coordination point for exchange health information, 
including authentication, authorisation, routing and 
logging. Such an implementation model may appear 
suitable for a small scale of national e-health structure.  
Implementation of this model in a geographically large 
country will produce more network traffic, possibly 
creating performance bottlenecks; it is particularly prone 
to a single point of failure weakness.   
4.2 National Health Service (NHS) in England 
The National Health Service (NHS) in England 
implements the National Programme for IT (NPfIT) to 
deliver the central electronic healthcare record system. 
This central system is known as Spine. Spine provides 
national e-health services in England including: 
 The Personal Demographics Service (PDS), which 
stores patients’ demographic information including 
unique patient identifiers - NHS Numbers; 
 Spine Directory Services (SDS), which provides 
directory services for registered healthcare 
providers and organisations; 
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 National Care Record (NCR), which contains 
clinical information summaries as well as the 
location of the detailed healthcare information; 
 Legitimate Relationship Service (LRS), which is an 
authorisation logic containing details of 
relationships between healthcare professionals and 
patients and patient preferences on information 
accessing; and 
 Transaction and Messaging Spine (TMS), which 
provides routing for querying and responding to 
clinical messages via the NCR (Spronk 2007). 
The English national e-health services include 
identification and authentication, authorisation logic, 
clinical summary information, directory services and 
routing.   This programme is implemented in England, 
while Wales is running another national programme. The 
separate provisions of national e-health systems need to be 
made interoperable for information traversing across 
national borders. 
4.3 USA Health Information Exchange (HIE) 
USA National Institute for Standards and Technology 
(NIST) recently released a document entitled Draft 
Security Architecture Design Process for Health 
Information Exchanges (HIEs) (Scholl et al. 2009) to 
provide guidance for the development of a security 
architecture particularly for the exchange of healthcare 
information.  The HIE security architecture design process 
includes five layers to construct a security architecture for 
healthcare information exchange. The five layers include: 
(a) policies for overall legal requirements to protect 
healthcare information access, (b) services and 
mechanisms to meet policy requirements, (c) operational 
specifications for the business processes, (d) definitions of 
technical constructs and relationships to implement 
enabling processes, and (e) provisions for technical 
solutions and data standards for implementing the 
architecture.  
USA health information exchange architecture is based 
upon a hierarchical structure. Namely, it consists of a 
National Federation Health Information Exchange (HIE), 
Multi-Regional Federation HIEs, and Regional HIEs. The 
National Federation HIE, national federated technical 
architecture, connects a number of Multi-Regional 
Federation HIEs, involving multiple states jurisdictions.  
Multi-Regional Federation HIEs connect multiple regional 
HIEs. Regional HIEs can consist of two or more 
independent healthcare providers to share healthcare 
information. The participating healthcare providers set up 
their own trust agreement to define security and privacy 
requirements for the exchange of healthcare information 
(Scholl, Stine, Lin and Steinberg 2009) .  
The Identity Federation Service provides identification 
and authentication services. The entity can be 
authenticated via the Identity Federation Service or its 
home organisation’s authentication service to support 
single sign on for accessing the HIE services.  The 
privilege management is performed by service providers 
locally (Scholl, Stine, Lin and Steinberg 2009).  
The USA approach is different from the Dutch and 
English national e-health architectures. In a large nation 
like the USA, the distributed national e-health scheme 
seems suitable for scalability. USA e-health architecture is 
similar to the context of the DNS hierarchical model. This 
type of approach can mitigate the network traffic and 
performance bottleneck on the centralised e-health system.   
5 Lesson Learnt from the Internet’s Domain 
Name System (DNS)   
The Internet’s “Domain Name System (DNS)” has become 
a critical part of the Internet and of the “World Wide Web 
(WWW)” in particular.  Without its services many current 
information systems and services provided over the 
Internet would not function. Indeed, as Web-based 
applications rapidly become the “norm”, particularly in the 
public sector but also in the private sector, the resilience 
and high speed performance of the DNS have become 
mandatory requirements. The use of Web-based structures 
has been nominated as the basic functional structure of the 
Australia Federal e-health, NEHTA scheme. The DNS 
structure, determined some 25 years ago, is based around a 
globally distributed, hierarchical database architecture that 
relies upon replication for resilience and caching for 
performance.  However, it has been realised that the basic 
DNS scheme is insecure, in the sense that both 
confidentiality and integrity, including authenticity and 
authorisation, were not part of the overall design during 
the original design and development time of the early to 
mid 1980s.  
“Robustness and adequate performance are achieved 
through replication and caching” (Liu and Albitz 2006).   
Essentially, the client-server model chosen, via use of 
client “resolvers” and then “name-servers”, has been 
proven over time and is the model suggested in this 
architecture. The hierarchical nature of the DNS structure 
again appears suitable given that the Australian system 
must cater for a federated national structure with roles for 
the various State level participants. The “ccTLD” or 
“country top level domain” coupled with a “2nd level” 
structure appears to offer suitable benefits in organisation 
and management as well as the necessary backup 
resilience that is required in the overall scheme.  
The appropriate security arrangements, the 
“Transaction Signatures (TSIG)” structure based on a 
single-key cryptographic system again helps in this regard 
in relation to the secure synchronisation of actual DNS 
nameserver systems themselves. As Liu and Albitz (2006) 
state, “TSIG uses shared secrets and a one-way hash 
function to authenticate DNS messages, particularly 
responses and updates.” Similar schemes exist for 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity services in data 
networks in the banking and finance sector.  
As mentioned above, the original DNS structure did not 
consider matters of confidentiality and integrity. At the 
same time, the TSIG scheme is not scalable to any real 
dimension as nameservers correspond with an arbitrary set 
of other nameservers. The “DNS Security Extensions 
(DNSSEC) (Arends et al. 2005a; Arends et al. 2005b; 
Arends et al. 2005c)”, through use of “Public Key 
Cryptography”, enable DNS “zones” to “digitally sign” 
the necessary nameserver tables so that, on distribution, 
such tables can be checked for authenticity and integrity 
by the receiver.  The addition of appropriate DNSSEC 
records to the overall database structure provides a useful 
model that may be incorporated into the proposed 
architecture that is the subject of this paper. 
In summary, the overall DNS experience, and the 
structure of the DNSSEC security extensions provide a 
most suitable model for incorporation, in modified form, 
into the healthcare index architecture proposed. The 
DNSSEC structure assists in combating known attacks on 
the Internet system through such techniques as “cache 
poisoning”, “traffic diversion”, “man-in-the-middle 
attacks” and so on.  At the same time, however, the basic 
index systems, like the Internet’s DNS nameserver 
systems, must be installed and managed on basic computer 
systems, including the necessary operating systems (OS) 
that are sufficiently secure for the purpose. The immediate 
use of DNSSEC style structures is seen as essential given 
that many aspects of the proposed e-health record 
infrastructure will reside on the general purpose Internet. 
 
 
Figure 1 Proposed Architecture Overview and Key Information Flows 
 
6 Our Approach 
Generally, health information is stored over a number of 
different health information systems.  A national index 
system must be available for the provision of directory 
services to determine the distributed locations of the 
source systems holding the related health records.  Our 
proposal addresses this need by defining a model to 
support secure communications between healthcare 
providers and the Index System in the national e-health 
environment as shown in Figure 1. This proposed 
architecture is based on the broad architecture of the 
Australian Government’s National E-health Strategy 
(AHM 2008) and NEHTA’s Connectivity Architecture 
(NEHTA 2008b), both released in December 2008.  
Our proposed architecture defines the required 
constructs to share and transfer healthcare information 
securely between healthcare providers and the authorised 
national Index System.  This architecture proposes that the 
Index System should be built on a high trust computer 
platform as well as mandating that the participating 
healthcare provider’s need to adopt a high trust interface 
module - HIP as the application proxy to link to the Index 
System and other health information systems. 
Additionally, the authors argue that a fundamental security 
issue, that of name resolution, must be addressed prior to 
the interactions between the healthcare providers and 
national Index System. This paper, therefore, proposes a 
trusted architecture not only providing the indexing 
service but also incorporating a trusted name resolution 
scheme for the enforcement of communicating to the 
authorised Index System. 
Since the Index System is itself a critical application 
under any operating system, that Index System must be 
protected from even internal threats through the use of 
modern “flexible mandatory access control (FMAC)” 
structures. Under such an operating system, and as distinct 
from the less secure “discretionary access control (DAC)” 
systems, even a systems manager may not have permission 
to access the health record data. In simple terms, in these 
systems there is no “super-user” capable of obtaining 
access to all system resources at any time. If an individual 
nameserver system is “captured”, propagation of exposure 
will not extend beyond the compromised application itself, 
a vital concern in any e-health record indexing structure. 
Such systems exist and are commercially available, e.g. 
the “Secure LINUX (SELinux)” systems, “Solaris/SE” 
system, etc.  The proposed “HIP” structure would make 
use of such security enforcement to provide the necessary 
protection levels. 
6.1 Index System (IS)    
The authors argue that the load of the national Index 
System should be relatively lightweight to perform 
e-health indexing services efficiently. This can mitigate 
the Index System explosion and traffic bottleneck risks. 
Such an approach is favourable in a geographically large 
country such as Australia. To maximise the efficiency of 
the indexing services, the proposed Index System does not 
provide network connectivity services, messaging 
translation, addressing and routing functions and extensive 
logging of all message access. These services can be 
performed at the level of the local health information 
systems via the HIP, which is detailed in Section 7.2. The 
access control and authorisation process is best performed 
close to where the source system is, as each healthcare 
service provider might implement the service differently 
based on its own health information system access 
requirements. NEHTA (NEHTA 2008b) also states that 
there are no centralized network provisions to handle 
peer-to-peer communications; each service must manage 
its own interface to the network. 
The Index System will be a centralised facility run at a 
national level. It is envisioned that the directory service is 
devised in the context of a DNS, which uses hierarchical 
distributed database architecture.   
Our proposed national Index System performs common 
and fundamental functionalities including: 
 Identification and authentication, and 
 Directory services. 
6.1.1 Identification and Authentication 
Services  
The national Healthcare Identifiers Service (HI Service) is 
indeed one of the building blocks for the national e-health 
infrastructure. The national HI scheme for identification 
services must be deployed prior to the implementation of 
the national e-health system. The HI Service will provide 
accurate identification of individuals and healthcare 
providers in the national e-health environment.  
Individuals receiving healthcare services will be 
assigned an Individual Healthcare Identifier (IHI). All 
authorised Healthcare providers will receive a Healthcare 
Provider Identifier – Individual (HPI-I). Healthcare 
centres and organisations in Australia will be provided 
with a Healthcare Provider Identifier – Organisation 
(HPI-O). To be eligible to query the HI Service, a 
requesting entity must be nominated by a healthcare 
organisation and have an HPI-I associated with an HPI-O. 
The IHI Service will allow authenticated healthcare 
providers to lookup a specific IHI. The HPI Service of the 
Index System will provide lookup services to navigate the 
locations of healthcare providers to facilitate 
communication and the exchange of healthcare 
information  (AHM 2009). 
National Authentication Service for Health (NASH) is 
designed by NEHTA to provide PKI authentication 
services. NASH will issue digital certificates and tokens 
for   registered and certified healthcare providers and 
organisations (AHM 2009).  
6.1.2 Directory Services  
The Directory Service is one of the fundamental services 
in national e-health infrastructure. Since healthcare data 
are located at various places, directory services are used to 
identify and locate the available information. The 
Directory Service in the Index System provides a 
mechanism for obtaining the necessary information for 
invoking a service. This information contains the network 
location of the service, the digital certificate required to 
use it and other information required to invoke the service. 
It is envisaged this will be specified in Web Services 
Description Language
2
 (WSDL) format, which equates to 
Service Instance Locator (SIL) (NEHTA 2008d) 
functionalities outlined by NETHA. 
6.1.3 Operation of the Directory Services 
Based upon NEHTA’s definitions (NEHTA 2008a) on 
concepts and patterns for implementing services, the 
service patterns can be divided into two broad categories: 
synchronous and asynchronous services. A synchronous 
service occurs in direct response to a request. An 
asynchronous service has no relationship between the 
events. For example, to request a specific individual’s 
health records is a synchronous service. To send out a 
discharge summary report to a healthcare provider is an 
asynchronous service.   
With a synchronous service, when interacting with the 
directory service the requesting entity will provide proof 
of their identity (HPI-O) and the IHI associated with the 
records they are requesting. Once the requester has been 
authenticated by the Index Server, it will respond with the 
following: (a) a signed token attesting to the identity of the 
requester ({token}SignIS_PrivKey) and (b) a list of service 
instances containing health records for the person 
identified by the IHI 
(Service_Instance_1,...,Service_Instance_N).  
The entire response is signed so that the requester can 
be assured that it is a legitimate response from an 
authorised Index System and that any alterations to the 
response will be detectable. The response is also encrypted 
under a key known by the requester 
({...}EncryptHPI-O_PubKey), in order that the confidentiality 
of both the requester and the individual identified by the 
IHI is maintained. 
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The token is signed independently of the entire 
response in order that it can be reused with requests to each 
service instance. The full response is depicted in Figure 2. 
   
Figure 2: Service Instance Response Message Format 
The service instance information contained in the 
response identifies the target system location and 
information necessary for securely invoking that service. 
This may include, but will not be limited to the credentials 
/ certificates required to access the service. The signed 
token provided in the Index System response may be the 
only credential required, in which case the effort expended 
by the Index System in authenticating the requester is 
reused. It is, however, conceivable that additional 
authentication may be required by a given service 
instance. For example, the requester may need to prove 
that they are a member of a given practice or college of 
medical practitioners. 
With an asynchronous service, such as when a 
discharge summary message needs to be sent to the 
patient’s primary healthcare provider, the healthcare 
provider issuing the summary queries the Index System for 
the primary healthcare provider’s HPI, location and the 
digital certificate and then signs and encrypts the discharge 
message prior to transmission.  
6.2 Healthcare Interface Processor (HIP) – 
Proxy Service  
Our design philosophy of HIP draws on principles used in 
the Interface Message Processor (IMP) of the Advanced 
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). Each 
site uses an IMP to connect to the ARPANET network in 
order to isolate the potential hostile system connecting the 
ARPANET network. Our design rationale underlying HIP 
is to provide a secured communication channel for an 
untrusted health information system connected to the 
Index System as well as for health information exchange 
between healthcare providers. Wherever a connection to 
the national indexing system is required, a HIP facility has 
to exist. The design goal for HIP is to make it as a “plug 
and operate” facility, which is easy and simple to use for 
healthcare providers as well as with characteristics of high 
security, reliability, efficiency and resilience. Such a 
design would be very beneficial and useful particularly for 
healthcare providers. 
HIP contains its own on-board crypto-processor based 
on a trusted computing based module to store 
cryptographic keys. Any information system depends, 
therefore, upon a trusted base for safe and reliable 
operation, commonly referred to as a “trusted 
computing-base”. Without a trusted computing base any 
system is subject to compromise. For this reason HIP aims 
to run on top of trusted hardware, firmware and operating 
system. HIP, a self-contained unit configured with an IP 
address, is capable of running Web services. HIP carries 
out its works from layer 1 to 7 of the seven-layer OSI 
model. 
It is envisaged that HIP achieves provisions of security 
services and mechanisms based upon the security and 
management concepts of the OSI IS7498-2, including: 
 To establish a trusted path to connect to the 
authorised Index System,  
 To provide peer-entity authentication between 
healthcare providers and national Index System, 
 To facilitate secure healthcare information 
exchange in transit, 
 To provide data protection with appropriate access 
control mechanisms,   
 To provide interoperability to enable healthcare 
information exchange between disparate  healthcare 
systems with varying security mechanisms, 
 To support accountability when healthcare 
information has been accessed, and 
 To provide operation flexibility with “emergency 
override” and capacity flexibility for various scales 
of healthcare organizations.  
6.2.1 Trusted Path Establishment 
In response to the recent increase in DNS cache poisoning 
and traffic diversion attacks, we propose that the first step 
is to perform the enforcement of communicating to the 
authorised Index System prior to the interactions between 
the service requesting entity and the Index System. To 
achieve this, from a technical underlying process, HIP 
should be pre-configured to contact a DNSSEC capable 
server to perform a trusted name resolution in order to 
defend against false DNS data and assure that connections 
are only established with the legitimate Index System.   
6.2.2 Peer-Entity Authentication   
Many proposals are only concerned with the authenticity 
of the requesting entity (i.e. one-way authentication) but 
fail to address the importance of two-way authentication. 
Our proposed architecture provides a mutual peer-entity 
authentication service complying with the ISO 7489-2. To 
authenticate the authenticity of the Index System, the 
service requesting entity must validate the certificate of the 
Index System. Once the authenticity of the national Index 
System is assured, the Index System authenticates the 
identity of the healthcare service requesting entity.  In this 
sense, the authentication service of the Index System acts 
as a notarization mechanism in line with the philosophy of 
peer-entity authentication stated in ISO IS7498-2.  
6.2.3 Secured Communication Channel for 
Health Information Exchange 
The healthcare provider’s computer may have its security 
compromised. HIP, a hardened and qualified facility, acts 
as a proxy server establishing a secured communication 
channel connecting to the Index System and bringing 
isolation from the untrusted computer.  
HIP will be assigned a standard unique identifier (i.e. 
HPI-O) and be issued an asymmetric key pair for digitally 
signing and encrypting to achieve integrity and 
confidentiality goals. HIP contains its own on-board 
crypto-processor, thus it can facilitate the secure exchange 
of health information. In addition, HIP is built on the 
{{token}SignIS_ PrivKey,Service_Instance_1,..., 
Service_Instance_N}EncryptHPI-O_PubKey 
 
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) that is used to store 
cryptographic keys.   
6.2.4 Provision of Data Protection  
As various healthcare organisations may have their own 
specific access authorisation requirements and processes, 
access authorisation is best performed where the resource 
system is located. Once the requesting entity’s identity is 
authenticated, the request of particular healthcare 
information is presented to the target service provider.  
The HIP of the target service provider will provide the 
verified identity and the profile of the requester to the 
authorisation logic unit to perform access decision 
making. The authorisation decision depends upon the 
requesting entity’s profile and defined privilege 
management policy. The implementation of the 
authorisation logic unit is based on the “Sensitivity Label” 
function outlined by NEHTA (NEHTA 2008c). 
6.2.5 Interoperability Platform  
NEHTA
3
 is responsible for selecting electronic messaging 
standards in Australia’s health sector. It has endorsed 
Health Level 7 (HL7)
 4
 as the national standard for the 
electronic exchange of health information. HIP provides 
an interoperability platform by incorporating an HL7 
Interface Engine and Message Mapping Sets conforming 
to the HL7 v3 Message Standards for healthcare 
information exchange. HIP also incorporates an HL7 
Interface Engine and Message Mapping Sets for 
messaging Interoperability.  
HL7 Interface Engine 
Any non-HL7-compliant data contents are translated 
into the HL7 standard format (XML-based data structure) 
by the HL7 Interface Engine prior to information 
transmission. The HL7 Interface Engine contains a set of 
mapping algorithms to map data contents with an 
appropriate HL7 Message Template to generate an HL7 
message. 
Message Mapping Sets 
The Message Mapping Sets contain a repository of HL7 
Message Templates for various clinical and administrative 
messages. Each set provides one HL7 Message Template 
to serve for one clinical or administrative message. 
Message Mapping Sets will be designed and developed to 
meet the current healthcare service needs and will be 
imported into HIP. The HL7 Message Template guides 
and directs data contents to form an HL7 message.  
HL7 Clinical Document Architecture (CDA) 
HL7 Clinical Document Architecture (CDA) provides a 
framework for clinical document exchange. HIP imports 
the HL7 message into a CDA document. This CDA 
                                                          
3
NEHTA Sets Direction for Electronic Messaging in 
Health is available at 
http://www.nehta.gov.au/nehta-news/423-nehta-sets-direc
tion-for-electronic-messaging-in-health, accessed 
19/08/2009 
4
 Health Level 7, an American National Standards Institute 
accredited standard, has been developed to enable 
disparate healthcare applications to exchange key sets of 
clinical and administrative data. 
document is also associated with an appropriate stylesheet. 
The CDA document and the stylesheet will be sent to the 
requesting entity through Web services. The requesting 
entity renders the received document with the stylesheet in 
a human-readable form with a Web browser. 
6.2.6 Privacy Accountability   
Audit trail mechanisms can be used to deter unauthorised 
access to data to improve privacy accountability. To 
enforce privacy accountability, HIP could be configured to 
automatically trigger an audit trail event particularly when 
data is being accessed.   
6.2.7 Operation and Capacity Flexibility 
HIP aims to accommodate emergency override whereby 
any delays that may potentially occur through 
authentication and authorisation may be overridden. This 
is particularly relevant in the case of defined emergency 
including pandemic circumstances. HIP is designed to 
provide an emergency override provision called 
“Hit-the-HIP” for ease of operation.  
The HIP architecture is flexible enough to cater for 
interfacing at various levels. Examples of healthcare 
organisational structures include a one-person general 
practice clinic, and small or medium clinics to large 
hospitals. It is proposed that a number of design variations 
for the HIP facilities, depending on the healthcare 
structure, may include: 
 One-person healthcare practitioner,   
 Smaller healthcare practitioners, 
 Hospital administration, and 
 Regional hospital administration 
7 Envisioned Key Information Flows 
This section uses a scenario to illustrate the key 
information flows (see Figure 1) based on the proposed 
architecture described in Section 6. While a requester 
needs to inquire about a specific patient’s health 
information, the key information flows of the interactions 
between the requester, Index System and service provider 
are illustrated in the following steps. Note that all request 
and response messages prior to transmission are signed 
and encrypted for confidentiality, authentication and 
message integrity reasons.  
1. Peer-Entity Authentication Process 
1.1. Prior to peer-entity authentication, to ensure the 
secure resolution, the service requester’s HIP 
obtains the address of the Index System from the 
DNSSEC system which is pre-configured in the 
HIP.  
1.2. The service requester initiates a connection with the 
Index System via the service requester’s HIP. To 
ensure the authenticity of the Index System, the 
service requester’s HIP validates the certificate of 
the Index System. 
1.3. To ensure the identity of the service requester, the 
service requester logs into the Index System with 
his/her smart card containing their credentials. 
2. Health Record Enquiry Process 
2.1. The service request, containing the patient’s IHI 
and requester’s HPI-I, is sent to the Directory 
Services of the Index System to inquire which 
health providers hold the health records of the 
specific patient. 
2.2. The Directory Services of the Index System 
responds with a token and a list of the service 
instance information for service invocation to the 
requesting entity. This token indicates the requester 
identity assertion to enable single sign on for 
service invocation. 
2.3. The requester verifies the received information and 
then contacts each target service provider for 
service invocation. The requester sends the request 
including the token with other necessary 
information to invoke the service. 
3. Verification and Authorization Evaluation Process 
3.1. Each target service provider validates the request 
message containing the token and other necessary 
information for service invocation. 
3.2. In turn, the request is passed to the authorization 
logic to make an access authorisation decision 
based on the service requester’s profile indicated in 
the ticket and any additional authorisation attributes 
which are mutually agreed by the policy. 
4. Provision of Requested Health Record Process 
4.1. If the access is granted, the service provider extracts 
the health record from the data source. 
4.2. The service provider processes the requested health 
record into the HL7 message format.  
4.3. The target service provider sends the signed and 
encrypted information to the requester.  
4.4. The service provider records the information access 
for auditing purposes. 
5. Reception of Requested Health Record Process 
5.1. The requested information arrives at the service 
requester’s HIP. 
5.2. The service requester’s HIP verifies the information 
arrived and then extracts the requested information 
which is in HL7 message format. 
5.3. The message must be presented in a human 
readable format. The representation of HL7 
message is rendered and displayed to the requester. 
8 Analysis  
A first point of contact in any Index System must be itself 
verified for authenticity and integrity. In Internet terms the 
client system must be sure that it is connected to the 
correct Index System and not to some fraudulent system or 
via some intermediate node point capable of monitoring all 
traffic. The suggestion for use of a DNSSEC style 
structure in the overall architecture is seen as a minimum 
requirement for overall trust in the system. 
In turn, this implies that all systems used in the creation 
and operation of a “centralised” Index System must be 
security verified in line with accepted international 
standards. The main such standard is the “Common 
Criteria (CC)” set, 5  under international standard 
IS-15408, accepted by many nations
6
 as the base for 
evaluation of the security stance of any system.  Isolation 
of critical security functions into verifiable hardware and 
software structures capable of CC “protection profile” 
definition is envisaged along with the acceptance of a 
requirement for an associated evaluation at a minimum of 
an evaluation level of “EAL5”. This would apply to the 
HIP. It should also be a requirement that the USA’s “FIPS 
140-2”, the Federal Information Processing Standard, be 
used for the security verification of cryptographic 
functions, in line with accepted industry practice. 
Unlike previous structures, the HIP may operate at all 
seven layers of the OSI model and, indeed, be seen as a 
“proxy” for Internet interaction. For example, the 
functionalities of HIP include:  
 Routing control functions operating at layer 3, the 
“network layer” of  the OSI model; 
 HL7 interpreter functions working at the 
“presentation layer”, layer 6;  
 Web service operations carried out at layer 7 of the 
OSI model, the “application layer”; and 
 The encryption/decryption mechanisms at layers 2, 
3 and 4 of the OSI model. 
The proposed structure is cognisant of NEHTA’s 
architectural designs for the overall national health record 
index scheme proposed for Australia. Moreover, the main 
aim of the HIP concept is to simplify overall security 
control and management of the e-health environment from 
the point of view of those health professionals and 
practitioners who will be using the system in the future. 
The whole HIP architecture is seen as being able to be 
explained and understood by health professionals and 
related people who are not ICT experts. Moreover, the HIP 
and its security should be transparent to them in normal 
operation.  The goal of the proposed system is to make the 
HIP understandable and essentially transparent to users so 
that health practitioners can focus on their primary 
functions to deliver quality healthcare service. In this 
regard, control and management of the overall system is 
vested in appropriate information and network systems 
professionals, not the end users or health partitioners 
themselves.  
9 Conclusion and Future Work 
This paper proposes three distinct suggestions on the 
architecture set:  
(1) Trusted domain name services are a critical element 
in the overall trusted architecture of any indexing based 
healthcare systems to combat name resolution cache 
poisoning and traffic diversion attacks;  
                                                          
5
 The Common Criteria Portal is available at – 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org, accessed 
7/09/2009. 
6
 More information about the Mutual Recognition and the 
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement is available at 
http://www.dsd.gov.au/infosec/evaluation_services/aisep
_pages/aisep_partners.html accessed 07/09/2009. 
(2) A trusted architecture for the Index System which 
provides the critical solution to determine the locations of 
distributed health records. This Index System plays a vital 
role in the national e-health scheme for identification and 
authentication and directory services. The Index System, 
therefore, must be a high trust system running on a trusted 
platform; and 
(3) HIP plays a vital role as a proxy server connecting 
to the national Index System as well as linking to untrusted 
health information systems. The proposed “HIP” structure 
will be built on top of a trusted platform. This makes use of 
available security enforcement to provide the necessary 
protection levels.  
We envisage that the HIP would be subject to security 
functionalities and evaluation at the minimum 
requirements of EAL5 under the Common 
Criteria/ISO15408
7
, in which Australia participates under 
the Common Criteria Recognition Agreement (CCRA)
8
.  
There are a number of proposals to maintain 
summarised healthcare records within the overall index 
system/switching system (Spronk 2007; Spronk 2008). A 
summary of healthcare records in Australia is called an 
Individual Electronic Health Record (IEHR) (AHM 2008). 
Our architecture can accommodate IEHR: for example an 
IEHR database added in Figure 1. This proposal needs to 
be further examined in light of prior experience in other 
sectors, such as banking and finance industries. While it 
would appear possible to maintain IEHRs within the 
national Index System, practicality may indicate that, in 
line with the DNS system discussed in this paper and in the 
banking sector, IEHRs may be best implemented at the 
point where such aggregation is most feasible. In 
Australia, this would indicate, in light with the DNS 
system, a second level Index System at the state level 
which would also contain IEHRs. Under investigation in 
the overall project is the feasibility of aggregating IEHRs 
on demand for the use of point access.  
Point of Sale (EFTPOS) is a model that can be used to 
develop HIPs. Part of our future work is to design a 
prototype to demonstrate this. This paper forms a 
foundation for the creation of such a 
prototype/demonstrator high trusted Index System coupled 
with a prototype HIP. This will form a base of future 
requests for research funding. HIP will be developed as 
proof-of-concept which may be used when tendering for 
supply and installation. It is suggested that the government 
will issue the development and testing of HIP which 
involves the production of 5-6 laboratory prototypes and 
50-100 production prototypes. Upon the successful bidder 
testing, this proposal suggests that the government would 
issue tenders for the production and installation of HIP. 
This is based upon the successful experience in the 
financial sector, in particular, the successful structure and 
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 The international standard ISO15408 sets a strict 
guideline for evaluating security policy, program design 
documents, source code, manuals and other factors. 
8
 The Common Criteria Recognition Agreement (CCRA) 
Web site is available at 
http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/theccra.html, 
accessed 03/09/2009.  
deployment of Australian Electronic Funds Transfer at 
EFTPOS systems over the last 25 years. 
Although this paper concentrates on the Australian 
national e-health environment from a security perspective, 
our conclusions could be equally applied to any 
distributed, indexed based healthcare information systems 
involving cross referencing of disparate health data 
collections or repositories. 
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